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TAXATION OF TRANSFERS INTENDED

TAXATION OF TRANSFERS INTENDED TO TAKE
EFFECT IN POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT
AT GRANTOR'S DEATHBy HENRY
C.

ROTTSCHAEFER*

WHEN THE TRANSFER OCCURS

T

HE question of when the transfer occurs is of importance
in connection with the following problems arising in this
kind of taxation: (1) the law governing the tax; (2) the base
on which the tax is to be computed; (3) the jurisdictional problem; and (4) the problem of whether the taxing statute is being
given a retroactive effect and the validity thereof. The last of
these will be discussed under a separate heading.
The liability for any tax arises when those facts occur on
whose existence the statute makes taxability depend. The law in
force when those facts occur should, therefore, determine whether
a transfer is taxable. The decisions on the question when the taxable transfer occurs may, accordingly, be expected to throw some
light on the problem of what it is that is being taxed. The preceding discussion has shown various types of transfer that have
been held taxable, and convenience of treatment of the problem of
what law governs will be served by observing the distinctions
between them. The question can arise only where there has been
a change of law between the execution of the instrument effecting
the transfer and the transferor's death. It is universally held that,
where the donor reserves both a life estate for his own life and a
power of revocation, the transfer is deemed to occur at the donor's
death subject to the law then in force on the theory that such
dispositions are so ambulatory as to be in effect testamentary."5 3
Hence such a transfer by a non-resident of stock in a domestic
corporation is taxable where the law in effect at the time of the
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

'Continued from 14 ME1xEsoTA LAw REvrv 453. 493.
. 53Matter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278. 140 N. E. 697;

MacClurkan v. Bugbee, (N.J. Sup. 1928) 143 Atl. 757; see Riley v.
Howard, (1924) 193 Cal. 522, 226 Pac. 393, contra.
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donor's death included the transfer of such property by such a
donor although that in effect at the time the deed of trust was
delivered did not include it.34
Exactly the same result was
reached in a case involving the same problem where the (lonor
reserved in addition a power to appoint the remainder by will.""
The court in this case stressed both the ambulatory character of
the transfer and the fact that the remainders remained contingent
until the donor's death due to the reserved power to appoint. It
has also been held that the law in effect at the donor's death (etermines the applicable rates in a case in which the donor, although
creating an immediate life interest in another for that other's
life, reserved the powers to revoke and appoint by will and the
possibility of a reverter to him for his life. The principal reason
advanced was that the remainderman's interest vested,.and could
vest, only on the donor's death."' The same factor was relied on
in reaching the same answer to the same problem in a case in
which the remainders were held contingent in title until the donor's
death because the trust might have terminated during his life and
revested the property in him."-' If the donor reserves a life estate
to himself and disposes of the remainder to another if he survives
the donor, the transfer has been held to be testamentary in character so that rates and exemptions are governed by the law in
effect at the donor's death.""8 It may. therefore, be stated that.
assuming a transfer within these statutory provisions, the law
in force at the time of the donor's death governs whenever the
interest created by such a transfer remains contingent in title
or conditional in substance up to the time of such death. The
frequent emphasis upon the reservation of a power to revoke or
alter as a reason for treating a taxable transfer as ambulatory
164Matter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697.
155In re Hanna's Estate, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 159, 195 N. Y. S.
749; but see Estate of Murphy, (1920) 182 Cal. 749. 190 Pac. 46.
where the law in force at the time the deed took effect was held to
govern where the donor reserved a life estate with power to appoint
by will but no power to revoke; the court treated the reserved power
to appoint the remainder by will as ineffective.
3SGLilly v. State, (1928) 156 Md. 94, 143 Atl. 661.
15-People
v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547. 158 N. F. 861.
158
1n re Garcia's Estate, (1918) 183 App. Div. 712. 170 N. Y. S.
980, aff'd (1920) 192 App. Div. 902, 182 N. Y. S. 925. See also People
v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 330 Ill. 238. 161 N. E. 525, holding the
tax governed by law in force at time of donor's death where remainders limited on a reserved life estate were contingent on the
remainderman's surviving the donor; the opinion, however, is devoid
of reasoning directed at this particular problem.
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until the donor's death and, therefore, testamentry in character,
makes it practically certain that a state that holds that the mere
reservation of such power renders a transfer taxable would treat
such transfer as governed by the law in force at the date of the
donor's death. It may be incidentally remarked that it seems
somewhat inconsistent for a state to deny that the reservation of
such powers alone makes transfers taxable while admitting that
its effect in the case of a transfer taxable on other grounds is to
make it governed by the laws in force because of its testamentary
character.
The other group of cases in which the problem of the applicable law has been considerably discussed consists of those in which
the transfer was taxable because the donor reserved a life estate
for his own life. The decisions are practically uniform that the
law in force at the time that the deed of transfer took effect
governs in such a case.'5 Hence it is that law that determines the
The reasons generally asmatter of exemptions, 160 and rates.'
the
vesting
in interest,' 16 and not on
signed are that the tax is on
the transfer of the enjoyment.' 03 The same theory underlies the
arguments that in such cases there is a completed gift at the time
the deed of transfer is delivered. 6 ' As was stated in a case involving another point, the tax is a "charge upon the creation of
1

the right," not "upon fruition in enjoyment or possession ."

3

Reference should here be made to two cases dealing with the problem of the retroactive taxation of such transfers whose implications are inconsistent with the above line of cases. They involved
transfers that were transfers intended, etc., solely because the
3 9 Estate of Murphy, (1920) 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46; Hou-ton's
Estate, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 330, 120 Atl. 267; Chambers v. 9Lamb. (1921)
186 Cal. 261, 199 Pac. 33; In re Meserole's Estate. t1 16) 98 .Misc.
Rep. 105, 162 N. Y. S. 414; Brown v. Pa. Co. for Ins.. (Del. Super.
1924) 126 Atl. 715; Blodgett v. Un. & N. H. Tr. Co.. (1922) 97 Conn.
405, 116 Atl. 908; note that in Estate of Murphv the donor also reserved a power to appoint by will, but the court treated this as ineffective.
160 Chambers v. Gibbs, (1921) 186 Cal. 196, 198 Pac. 1032.
' 61 Estate of Felton, (1917) 176 Cal. 663, 169 Pac. 392; Houston's
Estate,
(1923) 276 Pa. St 330, 120 At. 267.
262 Houston's Estate, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 330, 120 Atl. 267; Estate
of Murphy, (1920) 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46; Chambers v. Lamb.
(1921) 186 Cal. 261, 199 Pac. 33. Brown v. Pa. Co. for Ins., (Del.
Super.3 1924) 126 Atl. 715.
26 Houston's Estate, (1923) 276 Pa. St. 330, 120 Ati. 267.
164In re Meserole's Estate, (1916) 98 Misc. Rep. 105. 162 N. Y. S.
414; Blodgett v. Un. & N. H. Tr. Co. (1922) 97 Conn .405, 116 AtI. 908.
lo5Mfatter of Schmidlapp, (1923) 236 N. Y. 278, 140 N. E. 697.
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donor reserved a life estate. Nevertheless they were held taxable
though no law taxing them was in effect at the time the deeds of
transfer were delivered because, among other reasons, the property vested in the possession and enjoyment of the remaindermen
upon the donors' deaths which occurred when laws taxing such
transfers were in effect.100 There is no doubt but that the prevailing doctrine accords more nearly with the technical interpretation of the language of these taxing provisions than do these last
two cited cases; which accords the better with the doctrine that
attaches greater weight to the shifting of economic interests than
to technical factors will be later considered.
The time when the transfer occurs is also important in determining the amount on which the tax is to be computed and the exemption to be allowed. The question can arise only where the same
person has been the beneficiary under more than one transfer taxable under the statute. The usual situation has been that in which
he has received something from the donor both under a transfer
intended, etc., and under his will or as his successor tinder the
laws of intestate succession. The cases herein discussed, except
where the contrary is stated, involved statutes that did not contain
any express provisions dealing with this question. It is generally
held that, if the grant makes a transfer that occurs on the donor's
death under the principles already discussed, the tax is based
on the aggregate of that received under the grant and under the
will or as successor under the intestate laws; it is immaterial that
they are derived under different instruments."' This has been
so held whether the factor that made the transfer occur at the
donor's death was the reservation of a power to revoke, 08 or
the contingent character of the interest taxed due to the fact either
that the trust might terminate before the donor's death.'
or that
the remainderman was to take only if he survived the donor.1 0
Furthermore, in such cases, but one exemption is allowed.'
216In re Wallace's Estate, (Or. 1929) 282 Pac. 760; In re Miller's
Estate,7 (1919) 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 409.
26 Matter of Dana Co., (1915) 215 N. Y. 461, 109 N. E. 557; In
re Cumming's Estate, (1921) 115 Misc. Rep. 276, 187 N. Y. S. 921:
Pratt v. Dean, (1923) 246 Mass. 300, 140 N. E. 924; People v. McCormick,
(1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861.
8
16 Matter of Dana Co., (1915) 215 N. Y. 461, 109 N. E. 557; Pratt
v. Dean, (1923) 246 Mass. 300, 140 N. E. 924.
169People
v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861.
170 1n re Garcia's Estate, (1918) 183 App. Div. 712, 170 N. Y. S.
980, aff'd (1920) 192 App. iv. 902, 182 N. Y. S. 925.
171 n re Furnald's Estate, (Surr. Ct. 1921)
187 N. Y. S. 921, aff'd
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Various reasons are assigned for these holdings such as that the
property passes under both methods at the same time and by
reason of the same event, 7 2 that both transfers are testamentary
in character,'73 and that, if the rule were otherwise, an easy
method would be afforded for reducing taxes.1 7 4 If the transfer is
on such terms that, under the principles heretofore discussed, it
is deemed to occur when the deed of transfer takes effect, sums
received under it are not combined with those received under the
will of the same donor,'-, and a separate exemption is allowed
against each type of transfer determined by the law in force at the
time that each transfer occurred.'
The logic underlying these
decisions would require each transfer intended, etc., where the
transfer was deemed to occur at the time the deed took effect, to
be separately treated with an exemption allowed against each. A
case is possible in which there had been several of them, each
occurring at a time when different laws with different exemption
provisions were in effect. It is difficult to see how effect could
be given to the rule that the taxability is governed by the law in
effect at the time the transfer occurs, unless each were thus separately treated. If, however, there have been several such transfers under one law, there is no such practical obstacle to lumping
them and allowing but one exemption. Any objection to lumping will then haiTe to be based on the proposition that the statute
taxes each transfer as a unit rather than all transfers of the same
type as a unit. The emphasis on the time factor in the cases permitting aggregation with but a single exemption where the transfers, though under different instruments, occur at the same time,
rather favors the view that transfers occurring at different times
are to be separately treated even though belonging to the same
(1921) 196 App. Div. 933, 187 N. Y. S. 935, aff'd (1921) 232 N. Y.
500, 134 N. E. 546; in re Cumming's Estate, (1921) 115 Misc. Rep.
276, 187 N. Y. S. 921; People v. McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158
N. E.72861.
1, Pratt v. Dean, (1923) 246 Mass. 300. 140 N. E. 924; People v.
McCormick, (1927) 327 Ill. 547, 158 N. E. 861.
x-3In re Cumming's Estate, (1921) 115 Misc. Rep. 276. 187 N. Y.
S. 921.
'74Pratt v. Dean, (1923) 246 Mass. 300, 140 N. E. 924.
1 5Estate of Felton, (1917) 176 Cal. 663, 169 Pac. 392; Estate of
Potter, (1922) 188 CaT. 55, 204 Pac. 826; In re Meserole's Estate. (1916)
98 Misc. Rep. 105, 162 N. Y. S. 414.
-l76In re Cumming's Estate, (1921) 113 Misc. Rep. 276. 187 N. Y. S.
921; Estate of Potter, (1922) 188 Cal. 55. 204 Pac. 826. See In re
Legett's Estate, (1926) 128 Misc. Rep. 306, 219 N. Y. S. 317.
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type. No case has been found deciding either of the two problems here raised, but it has been stated that a separate exemption
should be allowed against each type of transfer, but not against
each instance of such type where there were more than one. This,
however, was in a case in which the several transfers belonging to
the same type were made on the same date. 7 \Vhether a state
statute would be constitutional that required transfers intended,
etc., of the kind that are generally held to occur when the deed
takes effect, to be lumped with transfers of whatever kind occurring at the donor's death has not yet, so far as the writer has
been able to discover, been decided. The same may be said of
statutes attempting to lump transfers intended, etc., of the kind
just described, where they occur at different times whether under
the same or under different laws, and of statutes lumping these
with transfers of whatever kind occurring at the donor's death.
A court in one case that held against lumping a transfer of this
Idnd with that under a will seems to have been influenced by the
belief that this would have effected a retroactive increase in rates
on the transfer before death of doubtful validity.'" This would
not, of course, be true where all the transfers were under one
law that had remained unchanged during the period involved. If
the theory of the shifting of economic benefits be taken as a
starting point, there is not only no valid objection to lumping
under all circumstances, but it would seem to be a more valid
method than that actually adopted for the cases in which the
transfer is deemed to occur at the time the deed of transfer takes
effect. It should again be stated that the questions discussed in
this paragraph arise only in the case of several transfers to one
beneficiary.
The general principles governing the jurisdiction of states
to impose taxes on transfers intended, etc., are the same as those
governing their power to impose inheritance taxes generally and
will not be discussed. These transfers, however, raise several
problems of jurisdiction which, while not restricted to them, are
'-,-n re Thompson's Estate, (1914) 87 Misc. Rep. 539, 151 N. Y. S.
244; aff'd (1915) 167 App. Div. 356, 153 N. Y. S. 164, aff'd but on other
points, (1916) 217 N. Y. 609, Ill N. E. 1101; cf. In re Horler's Estate,
(1917) 180 App. Div. 608, 168 N. Y. S. 221, which involved another provision of the statute.
78
Estate of Potter, (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 204 Pac. 826. It may be
remarked that lumping occurs inevitably under the Federal Estate Tax Acts.
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yet different than the ordinary jurisdictional problem. The first
is as follows: A, while domiciled in the state B, transfers intangible personalty to T, a person domiciled in state C, in trust to
pay the income to A for life, remainders over; A reserves a
power to revoke; thereafter A dies domiciled in state B. It has
been held in Keeney v. New York, 79 that in such a case state B
can tax the transfer and that to do so does not violate due process
since the property had its situs in said state at the time of the
execution of the deed of transfer. It was stated that the validity
of the tax must be determined by the situation as it existed at
that time. Intangible personalty disposed of by such a transfer
has been held to have its situs in state B at the time of the
donor's death so as to be there taxable because he remained in
substance its owner until his death; the case, however, did not
discuss the constitutional question.' s0 It has been stated, but
not decided, that state C could also tax the transfer under these
facts.281 It is generally held that such transfers are governed by
the law in force when the donor dies because of their testamentary
character. If that theory be taken as the sole and required starting point in dealing with this problem, then the situs of the property at the donor's death should be determinative and the property be deemed as in effect owned by him until his death. The
theory adopted becomes of importance where the personalty is
tangible instead of intangible. If the tangible personalty, though
within state B at the time the deed was delivered, is at A's death
in state C, the domicile of T, it would seem that state B could
not tax it if the transfer taxed is that which occurs at the donor's
death even though the donor be considered the owner up to that
time. It might even be of consequence where it was intangible if
it should ever be decided that the problem of situs is to be de179(1912) 222 U. S. 525. 32 Sup. Ct. 105, 56 L. Ed. -99.
lsOLines Estate, (1893) 155 Pa. St. 378, 26 At. 728; the result accords
with that reached in Bullen v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup.
Ct 473, 60 L. Ed. 830.
8
8' Bullen v. Wisconsin (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473. 60 L. Ed.
830. See In re Hawes' Estate, (1914) 162 App. Div. 173. 147 X. Y. S.
329, aff'd (1916) 175 App. Div. 933, 986, 161 N. Y. S. 1128, aff'd (1917)
221 N. Y. 613, 116 N. E. 1050, in which, however, the court treated the
succession to remainders, limited on the donor's life under a deed also
reserving the power to appoint by will, as passing under the laws of intestate succession where the donor failed to appoint; the donor executed the
deed while domiciled in Massachusetts and died domiciled there: the
property had no situs in New York at time the deed was executed but
had a situs there when the donor died; the court held New York had
jurisdiction.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

termined by looking to the legal title and the actual physical,
location of the evidences representing the intangibles, where there
are such.1 8 2

If, however, the reasoning used in the case first

cited be adopted as a permissible premise, then state B could
tax, even were the property tangible personalty, if it had its
situs in such state at the time the deed took effect. The premises
that are permitted to be adopted would also have a bearing on
state B's power to tax if, after the deed had been executed, A
had died domiciled in another state, and in fact in every situation
involving state C's power to tax except where the property was
tangible personalty having its situs therein both at the time
that the deed was executed and of A's death. No cases have
been found deciding these matters.
Another situation that has been passed on by courts is as follows: A, while domiciled in state B, transfers intangible personalty to T, domiciled in same state, in trust to pay the income to
A for life, remainders over; A reserved a power to revoke;
thereafter A died domiciled in state C. It was held in MacClurkan
v Bugbee, 82 that the state C could tax this transfer, and that
it violated neither the state constitution prohibiting the taking of
private property for public use without compensation nor the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The reasons
on which the conclusion was based were that taxability was
governed by the law in effect when the donor died, that it was the
domicile of the donor and not of the trustee that determined
the right to tax, and that it was that donor's domicile at death
and not when the deed was executed that was decisive. Those
reasons would clearly prevent state B from taxing such transfer,
but other jurisdictional bases that have received recognition might
be invoked' to support its taxation of this transfer. Hlad the
transfer been to T, a resident of state D at the time the deed
was executed and when A died, state B's power to tax might
be supported by invoking the theory expressed in the Keeney
Case first cited in the preceding paragraph. Whether state D
could then tax would depend or whether the reasons of MacClurkan v. Bugbee or that in other cases were given decisive weight.
The complications that would arise if the property were tangible
personalty are obvious from the discussion in the preceding para82
1 See in this connection Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, (1929)
Sup. Ct. 59, which, however, involved a direct property tax.
13(N. J. Sup. 1928) 143 Ati. 757.

50
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graph and will not be repeated. It has been elsewhere stated
that a transfer intended, etc., in which the donor merely reserves
a life interest, is deemed to occur at the time the deed of transfer
is executed, and that the law then in force governs its taxability.
The question arises whether it is also the situs of the property
at such time which determines the jurisdictional problem. It
would seem that it logically should, and this view has been applied
in a case in which, however, the constitutional problem was not
considered.1 s The result irr that case was that the state taxed
only those assets that had their situs therein at the time the
deed of transfer was executed by a non-resident who later died
domiciled in the state. It need only be said in conclusion that
several difficult jurisdictional questions presented in the taxation
of transfers intended, etc., remains unsettled.
D.

RETROACTIVE TAXATION

OF SUCH TRANSFERS

The actual discussion in the cases of the question of the
retroactive taxation of transfers intended, etc., can be understood
only if the doctrines heretofore discussed as to when the transfer
occurs are borne in mind. The general doctrine that these tax
laws will not be given retroactive effect unless their language
expressly requires it is too familiar to require buttressing by the
citation of cases. But it gives no clue as to what constitutes
giving such statutes retroactive effect and no light on the validity
. of one requiring it. It has already been shown that transfers
intended, etc., may be made on such terms as to render them
testamentary in effect, and that in such cases it is the law in
force at the donor's death that governs their taxation. It would
seem that no statute could be deemed retroactive as to them that
was in effect at the time of the donor's death, irrespective of
the time of the execution of the deed of transfer. It has, nevertheless, been several times contended that to construe a statute,
enacted after the deed creating such transfers was executed, as
including such transfers where the donor died after it took
effect was giving an unconstitutional retroactivity thereto. The
theory of the 6bjection was that it took property without due
process of law in violation of the' due process clause of the
184Estate of Murphy, (1920) 182 Cal. 740, 190 Pac. 46.
185 0n this general subject, see R. W. Chubb, Retroactive Sxecession

Taxes, (1925) 10 St. L. L. Rev. 249; Note, Retrospective Operationof Succession Tax, 26 A. L" R. 1461.
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fourteenth amendment or of state constitutional provisions performing a similar function. The contention has been denied
where the transferor reserved a life estate for his own life and
a power of revocation, because such gifts approach so nearly
gifts by will that the legislature may "declare their substantial
identity for purpose of taxation.""1s" It has also been held that
it does not impair a vested right or contract, nor take property
without compensation, to tax a transfer by which the donor reserved a life estate and the remainder was contingent ol the
remainderman surviving the donor where the deed took effect
before, but the donor died after, the statute under which the tax
was imposed.1 s The reason assigned was that the remainderman's
interest was contingent until the donor's death. This reasoning
is difficult to reconcile with that in a New York case which held
invalid the taxation of a remainder limited on a life estate in the
donor who died after the enactment of the tax law passed after
the deed took effect. The reasoning was that the remainders,
whether vested or contingent, constituted present property
rights on the execution of the deed, and that their taxation under
a subsequent statute impaired the obligation of contracts and
took property without compensation.183 This reasoning is somewhat too technical where a question of taxation is involved.
The Massachusetts cases invariably emphasize that the tax is
on the coming into possession and enjoyment, and that. if that
occurs after the taxing statute takes effect, there is no retroactive application thereof. It is immaterial what terms of the
deed are relied on to show that that succession occurs at the
donor's death. Since that succession must, under the statutes.
occur at or after the donor's death, the net effect is that the
statute is not considered as being given retroactive effect if in
force at the time the donor dies.188 This theory is quite in line
with the theory that it is the shifting of economic benefits that
constitutes the really significant factor in those problems.
186 Matter of Schmidlapp. (1923) 236 N. Y. 278. 140 N. F. 697; Wec
also In re Hanna's estate, (1922) 119 Misc. Rep. 159, 195 N. Y. S. 749.
which applied a law enacted after the deed was executed but before the
donor's7 death to such a transfer under that deed.

1s Carter v. Bugbee, (1919) 92 N. J. L. 390, 106 Atd. 412.
1
SSIn re Craig's Estate, (1904) 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y. S. 971, aff'd
(1905) 181 N. Y. 551, 74 N. E. 1116.
's 9Coolidge v. Commr's, etc., (Mass. 1929) 167 N. E. 757; Crocker v.
Shaw, (1899) 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549.
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No case has been found in which it was attempted to apply to
such transfers a tax act that took effect after the donor's death.
Since, however, these statutes frequently tax transfers intended
to take effect in possession and enjoyment after as well as at the
donor's death, such a case is conceivable. Here it would probably make a difference whether the theory that relies oil the
testamentary character of these transfers or that resting on the
doctrine of the shifting of economic benefits were accepted as
the required test of constitutionality. It is difficult to see why
this would violate due process if it does not do so to impose
a tax on transfers resulting from the exercise of a power of
appointment created under the will of one who died prior to tile
taxing statute but exercised by the donee thereafter."z '" or why
it would not be valid under the principles enunciated in the
Saltonstall'9' and other cases.19 - The question, however, must
still be deemed open. It may, however, be stated that, wherever a
transfer intended, etc., is for any reason such as to be testamentary
in character, there is no real retroactive taxation if it is taxed
under a statute in force at the donor's death though there was
no statute taxing it when the deed of transfer took effect. and that
interpreting such a statute so as to include such transfers under
those circumstances does not violate either the contract clause or
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or provisions
of state constitutions performing a similar function.
The other principal type of transfer intended, etc., is that in
which the donor has reserved a life interest for his own life
The general rule is that the taxable transfer in this type occurs
at the time the deed of transfer takes effect. It has accordingly
been frequently held that to tax such a transfer under a law
enacted after that time but before the donor's death involves
giving that law retroactive effect. 93 To give such a statute
such retroactive effect has several times been decided to be un19 Oin re Vanderbilt's Estate, (1900) 50 App. Div. 246. 63 N. Y. S.
1079, aff'd (1900) 68 N. Y. S. 1150, aff'd (1900) 163 N. Y. 597, 57
N. E. 1127; Manning v. Bd. of Tax Conmr's, (1925) 46 R. 1. 400. 127
Atl. 865.
193Saltonstall v. Treas. & Rec. Gen., (1926) 256 Mass. 519, 153 N. E.
4, aff'd as Saltonstall v. Saltonstall, (1927) 276 U. S. 260, 48 Sup. Ct. 225
72 L. Ed. 565.
19-Cahan v. Brewster, (1906) 203 U. S. 543, 27 Sup. Ct. 174, 51 L
Ed. 310;
Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, (1897) 20 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267.
193 Brown v. Pa. Co. for Ins., (Del. Sup. 1924) 126 Atl. 715: People
v. Carpenter, (1914) 264 I1. 400, 106 N. E. 302; see also cases cited in
footnote 194.
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constitutional as a taking of property without compensation and
without due process of law, 0 4 and several other cases contain
strong intimations that this would constitute an unconstitutional
That there might be some quesimpairment of vested rights.'
tion as to the constitutionality of thus applying a subsequent
statute to a case in which the remainderman's title vested before
the statute was suggested in a case which sustained a subsequently
enacted statute as applied to a transfer under which the remainderman's interest remained contingent until the donor's death,t'"
Even the contract clause has been invoked to hold such retroactive application of a tax statute invalid.'09 The factor most
stressed in the decisions thus holding is that the interest was
vested prior to the time the statute took effect. This may well be
admitteed, but the fact remains that a shifting of some economic
benefits to the remainderman occurs at the time of the donor's
death. This is not to deny that, if a remainder is actually vested
when the deed of transfer takes effect, the remainderman can
dispose of his interest immediately at its discounted value;"'5 it
means only that on the donor's death there comes to him the then
value of his interest relieved of the necessity of discounting it
for the period of the intervening life estate of the donor. It is
certain that realizing on such an interest by such a sale is not
considered entering on its possession and enjoyment since the
situation now being considered is always held to involve a transfer
in which possession and enjoyment of the property transferred
take effect at the donor's death. It is emphasis on this factor
that has led one court to hold that to tax such transfers, made
when no statute taxed them, under a later statute in effect when
the donor died was not unconstitutional; the opinion does not
indicate which constitutional provisions it had in mind.' 0 Other
'94Hunt v. Wicht, (1917) 174 Col. 205, 162 Pac. 639; In re Craig's
Estate, (1904) 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y. S. 971, aff'd (1905) 181 N. Y.
551, 74 N. E. 1116.
19Lacey v. Treasurer, (1911) 152 Iowa 477, 132 N. W. 843; MNorrow v. Deeper, (1911)

153 Iowa 341, 133 N. W. 729.

Carter v. Bugbee, (1919) 92 N. J. L. 390, 106 Atl. 412.
197In re Craig's Estate, (1904) 97 App. Div. 289, 89 N. Y, S. 971.
aff'd 9(1905) 181 N. Y. 551, 74 N. E. 1116.
2 sAn interest that is contingent at the time of its creation can
theoretically also be immediately realized by sale, but the practical
probability of so doing is much less than where the interest is vested,
100

and may, in some cases, be practically nil.

579.

99Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bugbee, (N.J. Sup. 1928) 141 Ati.
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courts have held such transfers taxable under such circumstances,
The emphasis
but without discussing the constitutional issues. 0
in these cases is on the factor that it is the vesting in possession
and enjoyment at the donor's death and after the statute was
enacted that is the important thing. One case asserted that such
a transfer resembles one under a

will.201

It is apparent, there-

fore, that, while it is generally stated that a transfer intended, etc.,
of the kind now being discussed, is governed by the law in force
when the deed of transfer takes effect, and that, therefore, if not
taxable then, it cannot constitutionally be taxed under a subsequent statute in force when the donor dies, nevertheless there are
cases to the contrary that afford a convenient basis for those
states that have not yet committed themselves on the question
and which desire to reach such contrary result. That result
would seem to be more in accord with the theory that stresses
the shifting of economic benefits as the most important factor,
although, as already stated, it is undeniable that some such
benefits shift immediately upon the execution of the deed of
transfer.

The problem of retroactive taxation of these transfers has constituted the major constitutional problem specific to this type
of transfer. It may, however, be well to refer to the fact that the
power to tax transfers intended, etc., was definitely established
as against objections based on the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment in Keeney v. Nw,,
02

York.2

THE PROBLEM UNDER FEDERAL ESTATE Tax AcTs

The federal estate tax is levied on the transfer of the net
estate of a decedent. The net estate is defined as the gross estate
less specified deductions. Among the items includible in the gross
estate is property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has during his life made a transfer, or created a trust,
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
20OAm. Bd. of Comm. v. Bugbee, (1922) 98 N. J. L. 84, 118 Ati.
700, aff'd sub nor Cong. Home Miss. Soc. v. Bugbee, (1925) 101 N. J. L.
214, 127 Atl. 192; In re Wallace's Estate. (Or. 1929) 282 Pac. 760: In re
Miller's Estate, (1919) 43 Nev. 12, 177 Pac. 409, aff'd sub. norm.. Nickel
v. Cole,
(1921) 256 U. S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. 467, 65 L. Ed. 900.
202
In- re Wallace's Estate, (Or. 1929) 282 Pac. 760.
202(1912) 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105, 56 L. Ed. 299.
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his death. The tax is generally held to be on the transfer of, rather
than on the succession to, property of the decedent. It taxes
not the interest to which some person succeeeds on a death,
but the interest which ceases by reason of the death. " ' While this
difference is important in connection with some tax problems, it
is rather difficult to say how much it has influenced the courts
in determining what property must be included in the gross estate
under this provision. The cases are not in accord as to what
transfer is the subject of the tax. It has been stated that the
tax is an excise on the transfer of the decedent's property by
his will (in this case he had made a will), not on the transfer
intended, etc., made during his life, and that the property disposed of by the latter is one element in measuring the tax on
the former.2 0 4

On the other hand, it has been said that the

language of the statute "is not consistent with the idea that it
utilizes the gross estate merely to measure a proper charge upon
the transfer by death.12 0 5

The same case, however, contains

language further along in the opinion that seems to adopt the
very theory of what is being taxed that it had just rejected. It
states, for example, that the staute requires the executors to pay
,an excise ostensibly laid upon the transfer of property by death
from the decedent to the executors, but reckoned upon its value
plus the value of other property conveyed before the statute was
enacted. Furthermore, in the course of its argument to show
the arbitrary character of the tax, it says that, if the deceased
leaves no estate, there is no tax, but, if he leaves even the smallest
estate, it and the property transferred during his life become
liable. These statements may possibly be explained as due to the
fact that the court merely adopted this theory, which had been
advanced by the government, for the sake of showing that the
retroactive application of the tax was arbitrary and unconstitutional on the basis of the government's own premises. Furthermore, it has been stated that the subject of the tax is the shifting
203

Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L.

Ed. 1184.
0

2 4Frew v. Bowers, (C.C.A. N. Y. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 625, cert. granted
(1926) 273 U. S. 682, 47 Sup. Ct. 237, 71 L. Ed. 838. dismissed by consent, (1927) 275 U. S. 578, 48 Sup. Ct. 22, 72 L. Ed. 436. The same idea
is expressed in Coolidge v. Nichols, (D.C. Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112,
aff'd (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184.
20
Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L.
Ed. 1184.
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of the economic interest in the property.200 That occurs in the
case of transfers intended, etc., because of that transaction, not
because the decedent has left other property transferred by a
will or under the laws of intestate succession. That view, therefore, indicates a theory that the subject of the tax resulting from
the inclusion of property disposed of by such a transfer is the
transfer itself rather than the transfer by will or intestate succession. It would seem desirable to have some agreement as to
what is being taxed in the case of the inclusion of these transfers
in the decedent's gross estate in order to avoid inconsistent
premises in determining the scope of the taxes imposed by this
provision. The lack of it may not be particularly important in
the general run of cases; it may become so in those on the border
line.
A.

WHEN PROPERTY THUS TRANSFERRED

INCLUDIBLE IN GROSS

ESTATE
The most convenient way of considering when property disposed of by these transfers is includible in the transferor's gross
estate is to follow as nearly as possible the order used when
discussing state inheritance taxes. The statutes have always
excepted transfers by a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth.20 7 Hence the only
question has been what constituted such consideration. There
have been but few decisions on it. A transfer under an antenuptial agreement made in return for a surrender of dower rights
is held to be within this exception;20S but a transfer by which
the parties in substance each grant the other a remainder in the
property limited on a life estate reserved by the grantor, though
not without consideration, is not a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in money or money's worth.20 9
206
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct.
123, 73 L. Ed. 410. This same case also contains the following language:
"In its plan and scope the tax is one imposed on transfers at death or
made in contemplation of death and is measured by the value at death
of the
207interest which is transferred."
The Revenue Act of 1926, now in force, uses the language "adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth;" the prior
Revenue Acts used the language "fair consideration in money or
worth."
mnoney's
20
8Ferguson v. Dickson, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 300 Fed. 961. cert.
denied, (1924) 266 U. S. 628, 45 Sup. Ct. 126, 69 L. Ed. 476; McCaugin
v. Carver, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1927) 19 F. (2d) 126.
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The case in which a donor has transferred property, reserving
an estate for his own life, is.one that has been frequently passed
on. The decisions under state inheritance tax statutes are unanimous that this is a transfer intended to.take effect in possession
or enjoyment at the donor's death. If, then, this language in the
federal estate tax act describes the same fact situations described
by the same expression in the state statutes, then would the
property thus disposed of have to be treated as part of the donor's
gross estate. It has been held a part thereof in most cases.'-"" It
was so held in one case on the theory that this was in substance
such a post-mortem disposition of the property as the statute was
intended to tax.2 1'

The decision in another case was based on

the reasoning that the donor, by reserving the income for is
life, retained an interest in the property until his death, that it
was only then that the transaction was fully completed, and that
the beneficiaries acquired no benefits until that time.2 1 2 The fact
that the interest of the remainderman was technically vested prior
to the donor's death is immaterial since the tax question does not
depend for its answer on such consideration..2 1 1

There have,

however, been contrary decisions. One of these rested on the
theory that the donor had by the transfer completely divested himself of the title to the property, and that, therefore, the fact that
the beneficiaries were postponed until his death, as far as the
actual enjoyment of the property was concerned, was ininaterial.2 1 4 Another adopts the position that property can be held
to have been disposed of by a transfer intended, etc., so as to be
includible in the gross estate, only if the transfer remains in-oSafe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Tait, (D.C. Md. 1923) 295 Fed. 429. See
also Phillips v. Gnichtel, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 662 cert.
denied. (1928) 278 U. S. 636, 49 Sup. Ct. 33, 73 L. Ed. 553; this, however,21involved
a transfer in contemplation of death.
0
Reed v. Howbert, (D. C. Colo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641; Cleveland
Tr. Co. v. Routzahn. (D. C. Ohio 1925) 7 F. (2d) 483, reversed on
other grounds, (C.C.A. 6th Cir.) 22 F. (2d) 1009. McCaughn v. Girard
Tr. Co., (C.C.A. Pa. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 520.
2
"McCaughn v. Girard Tr. Co., (C.C.A. Pa. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 520.
212
Reed v. Howbert, (D.C. Colo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641.
-ll3McCaughn v. Girard Tr. Co., (C.C.A. Pa. 1926) 11 F. (2d) 520.
which reversed (D.C. Pa. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 618, which had held the
property not includible in donor's gross estate largely because the remainderman had received a vested remainder when the deed of transfer
was delivered; but see Stark v. United States, (D.C. Ohio 1927) 24 F.
(2d) 237, reversed, (C.C.A. 8th Cir.) 32 F. (2d) 453.
2 4

1 Boyd v. 'United States (D.C. Conn. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 488; the

decision also rests on other' grounds.
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complete up to the time of the donor's death.:?" ' It purports to
derive this test from Nichols v. Coolidge, Reinccke v. Northern
Trust Co., and Chase National Bank v. United States.:'" The importance attached by the last two of these cases to the shifting
of economic interests is rather an argument against than for such
views. It is undeniable that a donor who transfers property
with a reservation of a life estate or right to the income for
his own life retains the most important economic interest therein
until his death, and that that interest is furthermore either a legal
or equitable estate in the property.217 If the purpose is to include
in the gross estate the property interests retained by the decedent
until his death, and the property whose economic benefits he
enjoyed until that time, there is every reason for including property disposed of during his life by a transfer under which he
reserved a life interest in the thing transferred. It is, of course,
true that, in a technical sense, his interest does not pass at his
death, but his death is the event on whose occurrence like
benefits shift to the remainderman. The cases first discussed
should, therefore, be considered as correctly stating the law on
this matter. The effect upon taxability of a release by the donor
of his life interest cannot yet be considered as definitely decided.
There have been cases in which this occurred in which the transfers were nevertheless held transfers intended, etc., but the
property excluded from the gross estate because its inclusion
would have required giving the statute an unconstitutional retroactivity. 18 Furthermore neither case considered this problem.
The question of when a transaction is such that a donor has
reserved a life interest in transferred property has not received
as extensive consideration under the federal estate tax act as it
has under state inheritance tax statutes. It may be assumed
that courts will not permit the tax to be avoided' by the device
215Carnill v. McCaughn (D.C. Pa. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 696; the decision
also rests on other grounds.
21ONichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L.
Ed. 1084; Reinecke v. Northern Tr. Co., (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup.
Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410; Chase Natel Bk. v. United States, (1928) 278
U. S. 327, 49 Sup. Ct. 126, 73 L. Ed. 405.
2 7This statement assumes that the cestui's rights are at least in
-part in rem. It lies beyond the scope of this article to set forth the
arguments for and against this proposition.
2lSCoolidge v. Nichols, (D.C. Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112, aff'd but
witliout passing on this matter, Nichols v. Coolidge, (1927) 274 U. S.
531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184; Hill v. Nichols, (D. C. Mass. 1927)
18 F. (2d) 139.
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of a transfer of the full legal interest to one who reconveys a
life interest to the donor, or promises to pay him for life the
income from the property, under a contemporaneous agreement

or understanding to that effect.

If, however, the promise to pay

the income to the donor for his life is in no sense attributable to
such contemporaneous agreement or understanding, but is made
for wholly different and independent reasons, the property is not
deemed to have been disposed of by a transfer of this character
and is, therefore, not includible in the original donor's gross
estate. 1 " The court in this case attached some importance to
the fact that the subsequent agreement as to the income left the
title in the original donee, but this reason is scarcely adequate.
It has also been decided that the transfer of a house, followed
immediately by a lease for one year by the donees to the donor
at a nominal rent and with a privilege of renewal but terminable by
either party at a month's notice, was not one, intended, etc., and
hence the property not includible in the donor's gross estate.
though it seems to have been understood by the parties that the
donor would be allowed to lease as long as she desired to use the
same as her residence.2- 0) The reasons assigned were that the
deed vested the full and complete title in the donees at once, and
that their right to come into full possession and enjoyment did
not depend on the donor's death; in fact, the court seemed of
the opinion that they had these immediately on the delivery of
the deed.2 ' It would seem that this decision opens a wide loophole for tax avoidance. Whether a transfer in return for the
payment of an annuity constitutes one such that the property must
be included in the gross estate cannot yet be said to have been
definitely determined.
It has been held such a transfer even
where the annuity was not charged on the property but where
the donees in effect pledged the transferred property to secure
the payment of the notes evidencing the required annual payments to the donor.222 On the other hand in another case containing' all the essential elements of a transfer in return for an
annuity paid by another but guaranteed under certain conditions
by the donee, the transaction was treated as the purchase of an
219
Norris v.
22
OCoolidge
221

Goodcell, (D.C. Calif. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 181.
v. Nichols, (D.C.Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112.
The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in affirming the decision in Nichols v. Coolidge. (1927) 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71
L. Ed. 1184.
2432Tips v. Bass, (D.C. Texas 1927) 21 F. (2d) 460.
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annuity by the donor, and the transfer held not within the statute
because the donee entered into the possession and enjoyment of
the purchase price at once.2"
The court of claims has also held
non-includible property transferred in return for the donee's
promise to pay a stated annuity to the donor's wife for her life.
and to him for his life if she pre-deceased him, on the theory
that the donor had completely divested himself of all title and
interest at the time of the transfer, urging in proof thereof that
the property was not chargeable with the annuity. " -" It is to be
hoped that the final decision on this question may be reached
without invoking some of the insubstantial distinctions that state
courts have made in dealing with the same problem. The ca.se for
taxability is clear where the annuity is charged on the transferred property; almost as clear where that property is used to
insure performance of the promise to pay; and it is at least
debatable whether there is any substantial difference of sufficient
importance between them and the case where the annuity, though
not a charge on the property, bears a close relation to the income
therefrom and is probably expected to be paid from such income.
The donor may transfer the property so as to confer upon
others the whole series of future uses and incomes to commence
immediately, reserving for himself only the power to amend or
revoke. Such cases raise the problem of the effect upon taxability of reserving such powers. The decisions, though not
uniform, support the holding that the property disposed of by
such a transfer must be included in the gross estate. "
The
principal reason relied on is that the reservation of such power
leaves the transfer, as to the donor, incomplete, and gives him a
legal interest which is subject to the tax. It has. however, been
stated, but not decided, that the mere reservation of such power
would not make the property includible in the gross estate if
possession and enjoyment are in fact not postponed till the
donor's death.2 2 - If, however, the power can be exercised only
223Polk v. Miles, (D.C. Md. 1920) 268 Fed. 175.
2 24
Hirsh v. United States, (Ct. of Cl. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 982.
22 5MIcCaughn v. Fed. Trust Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d)
443, reversing, (D.C. Pa. 1926) 17 F. (2d) 605; Dean v. Willcutts, (D.C.
Minn. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 374.
226
Stark v. United States, (D.C. Ohio 1926) 14 F. (2d) 616; see
also Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1928) 29
F. (2d) 14, which reversed, (D.C.N.Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 706, which was
in accord with the cases cited in footnote 224.
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with the consent of the beneficiaries, whose interests in this matter are adverse to the donor's, the property is not includible since,
for all practical purposes, it has "passed as completely from any
control by the decedent which might inure to his own benefit
as if the gift had been absolute." 227 It has even been held that a
reserved power to revoke only with the consent of trustees removable at will prevented the inclusion of the property in the
gross estate, although this court would clearly have held the
same way had the power to revoke been unconditional.2 2 8 The
reason stated was that the original deed transferred all the donor's
title, possession and enjoyment, and that the reservation of a power
to revoke did not affect this. The mere fact that a gift may be
revoked under state law is not sufficient to require the property
to be included in the taxable estate. 22 9 The mere reservation of
extensive powers of control and management does not make the
transfer taxable if they do not save to the donor power to control it for his own benefit.220

It may, therefore, be taken as

established since the Reinecke Case that the effect upon taxability of the donor's reservation of powers of amendment, revocation or control depends entirely upon whether their exercise
would enable him to divert to himself the economic benefits of
the property. If they permit that, the property is includible in
the gross estate; if they do not, it is not includible. An unconditional power to amend or revoke clearly does so and, therefore,
those cases correctly state the law that include property thus
transferred. No general principle can yet be formulated as to
when the reservation of other powers of control results in taxability.
Property transferred by a deed under which the donor reserves
not only a life estate but also an unqualified power to revoke is
clearly includible in his gross estate.231 The reasons relied on
227
Reinecke v. Northern Tr. Co., (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct.
123, 228
73 L. Ed. 410.
Farmer's L. & Tr. Co. v. Bowers, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1928) 29 F. (2d)
14, reversing,
(D.C.N.Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 706.
229
Newhall v. Casey, (D.C.Mass. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 447.
2 0
3 Reinecke v. Northern Tr. Co. (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. St.
123, 231
73. L. Ed. 410.
Home Trust Co. v. Edwards, (D.C.N.Y. 1929) 30 F. (2) 976;
Stark v. United States, (D.C. Ohio 1926) 14 F. (2d) 616, decision reversed on constitutional grounds, (D.C. Ohio 1927) 24 F. (2d) 237,
which was itself reversed, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453;
Reinecke v. Northern Tr. Co., (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123.
73 L. Ed. 410.
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have been sufficiently covered in discussing the effect of each such
xeservation upon taxability. A fact situation that has come before
the courts several times is that in which a donor has created a
trust to pay the income to another for that other's life, on the
death of said other before the donor to pay the income to him
for his life, with remainders over. The donor predeceased such
other in every instance. There are two cases squarely in conflict on the inclusion of property thus transferred in the donor's
gross estate. The case denying taxability does so for the reason
that the right to possession and enjoyment passed on the execution of the deed and independently of the donor's death. 33 - The
decision sustaining the taxable character of the transaction stresses
the fact that the remainderman had neither a right to dispose of,
or to receive the income from, the property until the donor's
death. It also denied that the mere receipt of the income constitutes possession and enjoyment of the property, and required
the donee to be in actual possession and enjoyment of the property
itself if the transaction is to escape taxation. "33 There is a prospect that the issue may receive authoritative settlement soon since
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the last case.2- ' In
one such case the court stated that the amount includible in the
gross estate was limited to the value of the donor's reserved
interest, but taxability was denied on other grounds.2- ' If the
donor is to take back the principal if the immediate life tenant
predeceases him, the retention of said interest has been held to
make the transfer taxable since on his death there occurred a
shifting of economic benefits to the remainderman whose interest
up to that time was contingent."' It is clear that, in cases of the
kind considered in this paragraph, the donor has reserved an
interest however speculative it may be. It is also clear that on his
death prior to that of the holder of the immediate life interest,
the rights of the remaindermen are relieved of a condition that
might have defeated them entirely so far as the interest retained
by the donor is concerned, and that this result was conditioned on
32

Nichols v. Bradley, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1928) 27 F. (2d) 47.

- 33 3,ay v. Heiner, (D.C. Pa. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 1004, aff'd (C.C.A. 3d
Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 1017.
234(1929)

50 Sup. Ct. 35. The Supreme Court has, since this article

"was printed, reversed the circuit court of appeals, Mday v.Heiner (U.S.
.April 14, 1930).
235C uirley v. Tait, (D.C. Md. 1921) 276 Fed. 840.
236Dean v. Willcutts, (D.C. Minn. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 374.
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the donor's death. There is, therefore, a shifting of some economic
benefits on his death, and, if that be accepted as the test of
taxability, good reasons exist for including property thus disposed of in the gross estate. If the fact that the donor has
retained an interest be taken as the test, then reasons also exist
for reaching such a result unless the speculative character of the
interest is a sufficiently important factor to negative the force of
such reasoning. The state decisions heretofore discussed show
the same lack of agreement evidenced in the decisions just considered. The situation is clearly one that demands settlement
by an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court.
The question has several times arisen as to whether property
must be included in the gross estate if disposed of by a transfer
that disposes of the donor's whole interest therein but which
creates some interests that can take effect in possession pr enjoyment only at or after the donor's death. The question was first
raised in cases in which the donor transferred property in trust
to pay the income to others for the duration of the trust and upon
its termination to distribute the principal to others than the
donor, where the trust was to terminate at a fixed date or after
a fixed period. The cases arose because the donor in fact died
prior to its termination with the result that the possession and
enjoyment of the principal would commence only after his death.
Property thus disposed of was held not includible in the donor's
gross estate for the reasons that the deed of transfer divested
the donor of all his interest in the property and that possession
and enjoyment by the beneficiaries of the principal were not dependent on his death since that neither hastened nor postponed
them.2 37 Substantially the same reasons were assigned to support
a like result in a case in which the transfer in trust was to accumulate the income until its termination and then to distribute the
principal and accumulations to others than the donor, where the
trust term, though not in terms defined by reference to the donor's
life, must necessarily have endured beyond the donor's life expectancy.238 The lower court had held the property includible
largely because the trust term could not terminate during the
donor's life as measured by his expectancy. Neither of these
237Fid. & Col. Tr. Co. v. Lucas, (D.C.Ky. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 146.
8Shukert v. Allen, (1927) 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461, 71 L. Ed.
764, which reversed, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1925) 6 F. (2d) 551, which
affirmed, (D.C.Neb. 1924) 300 Fed. 754.
23
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cases decided the question where the donor, though divesting
himself completely of all interest in the property, did so by
transfers creating interests so limited that they could take effect
in possession or enjoyment only at or after his death, or so
limited that, while they might so take effect before such death,
they might also so take effect at or after such death and where
in fact they did so. A literal reading of the language of the
statutes was relied on by the government in including the property thus transferred in the donor's gross estate. The Supreme
Court, however, decided it to be not includible for the reason that
the statute showed no purpose to tax completed gifts, not made
in contemplation of death, in which the donor had retained no
control, possession or enjoyment. - 9 Reference in this case to
the factor that the gift was a completed and absolute one suggests the question whether property is includible in the gross
estate if disposed of by a transfer by which the donor divests
himself of his entire interest to others but creates some interests
that are at their creation and remain until the donor's death
contingent in title or at least conditional. It has been elsewhere
shown that state decisions are not in accord as to whether the
succession to such interests is taxable under state inheritance tax
statutes. The case that comes nearest to this problem is that of
Coolidge v. Nichols 40 in which the court held that a transfer
under which the donor had completely parted with all interest in
the property but under which the remaindermen were to acquire
the principal of the trust fund on the donor's death if they survived him, with alternative disposition if they did not, was one
intended, etc., and that, therefore, the property would have had
to be included in the donor's gross estate but for the fact that
the law could not be given retroactive effect for constitutional
reasons. The court treated the interest of each of the remaindermen who actually took the principal under the deed as a
vested one subject to be divested. The court also stated that it was
immaterial that the donor retained no interest in the property
until her death, a theory that has been expressed in at least one
other case 2 1 and which is clearly inconsistent with the implica239Reinecke v. N~rthern Tr. Co., (1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123,

73 L. Ed. 410. Note that the court intimates a doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute that attempted to subject such transfers to at:
estate tax.
240(D.C.
Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112.
24 1
May v. Heiner (D.C. Pa. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 1004.
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tions of the Reinecke Case. If the mere fact that a transfer
creates interests which can take effect in possession or enjoyment
only at or- after the donor's death affords no basis for including
the property thus transferred in the gross estate, it would seem
that the legal devices and factors by which such postl)onement is
effected should make no difference to the question of taxability.
The mere fact, however, that the donor's whole interest may be
divested prior to his death under one of two alternative dispositions does not relieve the transfer from the tax if the property in
fact passes under the other disposition under which the donor
24
retained an interest until his death. 2
The preceding discussion of the decisions under the federal
estate tax acts has shown that, while there is some lack of agreement as to what is being taxed when property disposed of by
transfers intended, etc., is includible in the gross estate, the trend
is in favor of the view that it is the transfer that occurs at the
donor's death as evidenced by the shifting at that time of the
economic interests in the property. The tests developed to determine taxability focus attention on the question whether the
donor retains an interest in the property until his death. If the
deed of transfer has that effect, the property in which such
interest was retained is includible in the gross estate; if not,
it is not includible. In determining whether such an interc.4t has
been thus retained economic and practical consideratiows have
been given more weight than technical legal analysis, and are
tending to assume an even greater importance. This represents
a correct approach to problems of taxation. It is difficult to see
why problems as to the distribution of the tax burden should be
determined by considerations of so highly a technical nature as
have been developed for other reasons in the field of property law.
B

RETROACTIVE

TAXATION

OF SUcH TRANSFERS'

4

'

The problem of the constitutionality of the retroactive taxation
of such transfers remained in a very unsettled and unsatisfactory
242Stark v. United States (D. C. Ohio 1926) 14 F. (2d) 616, decigion
reversed on constitutional grounds. (D.C. Ohio 1927) 24 F. (2d) 237,
which 3was itself reversed, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453.
24 0n the general question of the power to impose an estate tax
on such transfers, see note, Power to impose tax in estates in respect
of property transferred in contemplation of death or by conveyance
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death, 52 A. L. R.
1091. On retroactive taxation of such transfers, see Amberg' Retro-
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condition for many years. None of the statutes have attempted
to tax the net estate of a decedent dying prior to their enactment. 2," The problem has, therefore, been whether there could
be included in the gross estate of a person dying after the
statute was enacted (which was also after it took effect) property
disposed of by a transfer intended, etc., under a deed taking
effect prior thereto. It so happens that the transfers involved in
the cases hereinafter considered all antedated the enactment of
any federal estate tax act, not merely that one of such acts as was
in force when the donor died and under which the tax was sought
to be imposed.2 45 The first question is when can a statute be
said to have been given retroactive effect where a transfer of this
kind is involved. The answer was given in unmistakable terms in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.246 The Court therein said that
"a transfer made subject to a power of revocation in the transferor, terminable at his death, is not complete until his death,"
and that therefore, no retroactive effect is being given by applying to it a statute in force when the donor dies. Hence it sustained
the tax so far as based on the inclusion in the gross estate of the
property thus transferred against objections based on the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. The principle, of course,
applies only where the reserved power to amend or revoke is
such that its presence in the deed brings the transfer within these
terms of the statute. The case has been followed in several de2 47
cisions by lower federal courts..

It should be noted that the

donor also reserved the income for his life in the trusts involved
in these cases, but the Supreme Court made no reference to that
factor. It may, therefore, be taken as established that a transfer
that is for any reason incomplete until the donor dies occurs only
at his death as far as this tax is concerned, and that subjecting it
to the tax law then in force does not involve giving that law
active Excise Taxation, (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 691. note, Constitutionality of retroactive federal taxing statutes, (1928) 28 Col. L.
Rev.2 44
777.
As to the probable constitutionality of such an attempt, see
following cases under the federal gift tax, Blodgett v. Holden, (1928)
275 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 105, 72 L. Ed. 206; Untermeyer v. Anderson.
(1928) 276 U. S. 440, 48 Sup. Ct. 353, 72 L. Ed. 645.
245
Note that the problem of retroactivity in the Reinecke Case
concerned only those trusts created before there was any estate tax act.
246(1928) 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410.
247
Home Trust Co .v. Edwards, (D.C. N.Y. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 976;
United States v. Stark, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453.
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retroactive effect even though the deed of transfer was delivered
before there was any law taxing such transfers. Prior to the
Reinecke Case there had been contrary decisions-'Is based on
Nichols v. Coolidge; the donor in one of them-"9 did not retain a
life interest until his death, but this would seem to be immaterial
under the Reinecke Case. There have been no decisions since the
Reinecke Case determining what terms, other than those reserving
beneficial powers of amendment or revocation, will make a transfer incomplete until the donor's death. Such cases might arise
where the donor specifically provided for the reverter of the
property to him if the holder of an immediate interest for the
latter's life predeceased the donor, and where the donor predeceased such other person. It is doubtful whether it will ever
be held that a transfer is incomplete within this doctrine merely
because a trust may expire before the settlor's death, thus leaving
him with a possibility of reverter.
The other leading case on the constitutionality of including
in the gross estate of a decedent dying after the enactment of
an estate tax act, the property disposed of by a transfer intended,
etc., under a deed executed before there was any such tax act
is Nichols v Coolidge. 0
Under the transfer involved in that
case the donor had originally reserved
right to the income for
her life which was released during her life to those to whom the
principal was to be distributed at her death. The lower court
treated these transfers as having divested the donor of her entire
interest in the property; that, since the enjoyment of the principal
was postponed until the donor's death, it was a transfer intended,
etc.; but that the inclusion of the property in the gross estate
was so arbitrary as to violate the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.2 5' The theory was that. since the donor had parted
with all control over and interest in the property prior to the
statute, it was arbitrary to include as a measure of the estate
tax the property of others. The Supreme Court's argument is
not as easily stated. Its starting point is that the transfer was
in no sense testamentary and bore no substantial relation to the
transfer by death. The tax is said to be arbitrary because made
-4 sStark v. United States, (D.C.Ohio 1927) 24 F. (2d) 237. revered,
(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 32 F. (2d) 453; Hill v. Nichols, (D.C.
:If.
1927)2 18 F. (2d) 139.
49Hill v. Nichols, (D.C. Mass. 1927) 18 F. (2d) 139.

250(1927)
274 U. S.531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710. 71 L. Ed. 1184.
25 t

Coolidge v. Nichols, (D.C. Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112.
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to depend upon past lawful transactions, not testamentary in
character, and beyond recall. The Court also adverts to the
unfairness of the tax in cases where the property has greatly increased in value since the transfer since that is taxed if decedent
leaves any property at his death but untaxed if he leaves none.
This argument as framed by the Court assumes what has never
yet been decided by it, that the subject of the tax is the transfer
by will or intestate law and not the transfer intended, etc., itself;
this assumption runs counter to the Court's own theory on this
matter enunciated in the Reinecke Case. Furthermore, this argument rests ultimately upon the unreasonableness of the differences
in treatment between the two cases mentioned therein, and would
be equally applicable to two such transfers made after the enactment of the statute. If, however, the essential point of the argument is not the possible inequality between the two postulated
situations, but the arbitrary character of including the enhanced
value in the gross estate, again the argument is as applicable to
such transfers after as before the statute. It is unnecessary to
consider the argument that Congress cannot, under the guise of
taxing what is within its power, tax that which is without it,
since that contains no proof that anything is either within or
without its powers. It is practically impossible to discover in
the arguments of the Supreme Court in this case anything establishing that it is the retroactive application of the statute to
transfers antedating it that is arbitrary. They rather prove either
that it is arbitrary to include in the gross estate the property,
disposed of during life by a transfer which completely divests the
donor of all interest at once, at its value at the time of the donor's
death, or that it is arbitrary to include it even at its value at the
time the deed of transfer was delivered. It may be that the defect
in the argument could be cured by invoking the theory that such
transfers made after the statute will have been made with
knowledge of their tax consequences, and that the arbitrariness of
a retroactive application of the statute to these transfers consists
in imposing consequences that could not have been foreseen and
that cannot be avoided by the donor's sole act after the statute
is enacted. This consideration would appear to have considerable
merit.2- 52 It may, however, be taken as established law that the
2 2
5 The substance of this argument appears in the opinion in
Coolidge v. Nichols, (D.C. Mass. 1925) 4 F. (2d) 112.
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due process clause of the fifth amendment is violated by requiring
the inclusion in the gross estate of one dying after the statute of
the value at the time of the donor's death of property disposed of
during his life by a transfer that completely divests him of all
interest in the property if the deed of transfer was executed
before there was any estate tax act. Whether it will ultimately
be held invalid to include such property under those circumstances
even at its value at the time the deed was executed, and whether
it will ever be held invalid to include property thus transferred
by a deed made after the tax statute, depend on how far the
Court is willing to go in converting into law some of the implications of its own reasoning in the Coolidge Case. It may not be
without some significance that it expressly stated in that case
that it was not necessary to consider whether the provision was
valid as applied to such transfers subsequent to the statute's enactment. 03
There have been several cases which have involved the validity
of including in the gross estate of persons, dying after the statute,
property disposed of by a deed made before there was any taxing
statute, where the donor reserved only a right to the income for
his own life. The early cases involving this situation sustained
the application of such statute to such a transfer. 2 '1 The reasons

advanced in that one of these cases that discusses the matter most
fully, Reed v. Howbert,2
were that the transfer was complete
only on the donor's death, and that the decisions up to that time
sustained the validity of the tax even if the transfer were deemed
completed prior to the law's enactment. The most cogent and
extensive statement of the contrary view is found in Frcw v.
Bowers.2 " The opinion by Judge Hough starts from the premise
that the property whose transmission is taxed must be the property of the decedent whose estate bears the incidence of the tax.
He holds that the transfer was complete when the deed of transfer
was executed and that, therefore, the donor had no interest in
2 3
5 See in this connection, note J. P. H., Due Process-Retroactive
Federal
25 Inheritance Tax, (1928) 22 Ill. L. Rev. 437.
4Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Tait, (D.C.Md. 1923) 295 Fed. 429; Reed

v. Howbert, (D.C. Colo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641; Cleveland Tr. Co. v.
Routzahn, (D.C. Ohio 1925) 7 F. (2d) 483, reversed on authority of
Nichols
v. Coolidge, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 1009.
2
55Reed v. Howbert, (D.C. Colo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641.
256(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 625, certiorari granted, (1926)

273 U. S. 682,, 47 Sup. Ct. 238, 71 L. Ed. 838, dismissed by consent,
(1927) 275 U. S. 578, 48 Sup. Ct. 22, 72 L. Ed. 436.
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the property at the time of his death. The transferred property
was described as that of another at the time of the donor's death,
part of which (the increase in value) he had never owned and
part of which he gave away when the deed was executed. He
then formulates the question, on the assumption that the donor
retained some sort of interest, as whether Congress can measure
a tax on the donor by another's property, and concludes that
that is so arbitrary and capricious as to be unconstitutional. It
should be stated that he considers the transfer by the donor's will
as the subject taxed. There is not one of these arguments that
would not be equally applicable had the transfer occurred after
the statute, and hence it proves too much unless the cases holding
that the reservation of a life estate under a deed executed after
the statute makes the property includible in the donor's gross
estate are to be set aside, a very improbable thing. judge Hand's
argument follows somewhat different lines. He concludes that
the inclusion of the property in the gross estate at its value when
the donor died is so arbitrary and unequal as to violate the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, but states that he is not
prepared to hold that it would be invalid to include it at its value
when the deed of transfer was executed. Even this argument is
difficult to restrict to transfers antedating the statute. Here
again, however, the argument may be adduced that the imposition
of consequences that can be known in advance of conduct may be
reasonable where it would be arbitrary to impose them on conduct
not entailing them when that conduct occurred. The opinion hints
in this direction but makes no use of it.
It is undeniable that a donor who reserves a life estate in the
property transferred retains an interest until his death despite
the views expressed by Judge Hough in Frez v. Bowers. The
cases last considered are, therefore, materially different from
Niclols v. Coolidge, even though this case makes no point of the
fact that the donor had completely divested herself of all interest
prior to her death. That case has, however, been interpreted to
govern cases of the type discussed in the preceding paragraph. 1
State cases have generally held that the transfer occurs in these
cases when the deed is executed and have determined the issue
257
Cleveland Tr. Co. v. Routzahn, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1927) 22 F.

"(2d) 1009, reversing, (D.C.Ohio 1925 7 F. (2d) 483; Boyd v. United
States, (D.C. Conn. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 488.
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of retroactivity in the light thereof. But the issue in them involved a tax on the succession to an interest; the issue under the
federal estate tax acts turns on whether the donor retained an
interest until his death. The Reinecke Casc held that there was
no retroactivity if the gift was incomplete until the donor died
even though the deed of gift antedated the taxing statute. Reed
v. Howbert treated a transfer in which the donor reserved only
a life estate as one that remained incomplete till the donor's death
for the reason, among others, that the donor retained an interest
until that time. Frew v. Bowers treated it as a completed transfer
as soon as the deed of transfer was executed for technical reasons
and because the donor retained no interest thereafter.,
Tihe
adoption of the former view would bring these cases within the
Reinecke Case. The adoption of the latter view would not
necessarily mean that Frew v. Bowers was correct for it has not
yet been finally decided that the mere fact that a transfer was
completed in a technical sense makes the application to it of a
statute enacted thereafter but in effect at the donor's death retroactive in the prohibited sense. This would not be true so far as
Frew v. Bowers rests on the theory that the donor retained no
interest, but this view is clearly wrong on any valid theory as to
the meaning of "interest" in these tax statutes. So far as the
emphasis has been put on the shifting of economic interests, there
is as much reason for holding that this occurs on the death of a
donor who has reserved the economic benefits for his life as on
the death of one who has merely reserved a power to revoke
Since, however, the Reibecke Case and those following it all
involved trusts in which the settlor reserved both a life interest
and a power to revoke, there is a possibility that its scope may
be restricted to that type of case. The only safe statement is
that the issue on which Reed v. Howbert and Frew v. Bowers
reached contrary conclusions is still open. The same is true of
the question whether property thus disposed of before there was
any taxing statute can be validly included in the gross estate of
a person dying thereafter at its value at the time the deed of
transfer was executed.
The constitutional provisions invoked in these cases involving
the retroactive application of these provisions of the federal estate
tax acts have been those requiring direct taxes to be apportioned
25SThis has reference to the opinion of Judge Hough.
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among the states on a population basis, and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. The former of' these has quite
generally been held inapplicable because the tax has been held an
excise..2 5 9 The arguments based on it received a limited recognition in the opinion of judge Hough in Frc, v. Bowers,60 but
the same opinion also calls it an excise. It is unnecessary to
recapitulate the consideration the due process argument has received. It is the one now generally invoked.
It remains only to indicate several unanswered questions bearing on the problem of the retroactive application of these provisions of the federal estate tax acts. No case has been found
discussing the validity of applying the statute in force when a
donor dies to a transfer intended, etc., made prior theret but
while there was in force a similar statute repealed by the statute
in force when the donor dies. There would be no question of its
validity as applied to a transfer incomplete until the donor's
death. - 11 It would be reasonable to consider successive similar
statutes as in substance the continuation of a single statute during
the entire period so that, if the one in force when the donor dies
in terms applies to such transfers antedating it, its application to
such prior transfers would be valid. The statute in force when
he dies must, however, contain provisions making it applicable
G" 2
to such prior transfers.2
CoNCLUsioN

It is clear from the preceding discussion that it would be practically impossible to construct a succinct definition covering the
whole content that has been given the conception "taking effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after death" as used in state
inheritance tax statutes, federal estate tax acts, or both. It is,
however, possible to indicate the factors that have played the
largest part in shaping it. This can best be done by pointing
out those elements of property that are really significant in dealing
with these tax questions. The arguments employed in deciding
5OSReed v. Howbert, (D.C. Colo. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 641; Cleveland
Trust Co. v. Routzahn. (D.C.Ohio 1925) 7 F. (2d) 483, reversed on
other2 grounds, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1927) 22 F. (2d) 1009.
Go(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 625. See Amberg, Retroactive
Excise
Taxation, (1924) 37 Harv. L. Rev. 691.
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For such a case see Dean v. Willcutts, (D.C.Minn. 1929) 32 F.
(2d) 374.
2C2Carnill v. McCaughn, (D.C.Pa. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 696.
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whether there was a taxable succession under state inheritance
tax statutes have stressed either that the donor retained something until his death, or that the donee acquired, or could acquire,
something only at or after such death; the arguments employed
in deciding issues under the federal estate tax acts have most
frequently emphasized the former of these factors. The question
is, what is that "something"? The cases holding taxable the succession to a remainder, vested or contingent, limited on a life
estate reserved to the donor, or that property thus transferred is
includible in the donor's gross estate, support the view that that
"something" is the right presently to receive the income or beneficial uses of the transferred property. They also show that
it is not the mere power to presently dispose of sonic part of
the series of future incomes and benefits. That power, however,
is important if it relates to and contains the contemporaneous
unit of that income or benefit series. That factor is particularly
important wherever the question of taxability turns on the reservation of powers of amendment or revocation. It is the disposition of, and control over, these elements of property, made by
the transfer, to which courts look in determining whether a
transfer comes within the meaning of these statutory provisions.
These are the substantial factors back of the recent emphasis on
the importance for these tax problems of the shifting of the
economic interests in property. It is the disposition made by
the transfer of the enjoyment of the property, that is, of its
income or beneficial uses, that determines, and should determine,
whether a transfer creates a taxable succession, or whether the
transferred property is to be included in the donor's gross estate.
It would not, however, be wholly accurate to affirm that the
whole law developed about these statutory provisions can be
interpreted from the suggested point of view. That has been in
part shaped by transferring to these tax problems considerations
derived from the technical rules of property law. These have
had some influence on the problem of what transfers come within
these statutory terms. They have, however, had their greatest
influence on the problem of when a transfer occurs, under state
inheritance tax statutes, and on the problem of retroactivity under
both the state and federal statutes. There is some evidence that
the more significant factor of the shifting of economic interests
may become a determining factor even in these problems. This
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will not, of course, change the law in those states that have already
decided these matters, but it may help to shape it in those jurisdictions that have thus far not committed themselves on these quesions. It should be stated in conclusion that the adoption of
the test of the shifting of economic benefits is not a means for
avoiding difficulties in this field since it is not always easy to
determine that this occurs at one time rather than another. Cases
arise in -which it would be impossible to deny tlhat some economic
benefits shift at one time although others shift at another. It
must, however, be said that the viewpoint expressed in this
doctrine focuses attention on what should be the really important factors in settling these questions of taxation.

